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Abstract
This paper argues against the most important theoretical 
foundations which Walter Block uses to defend his thesis 
that Evictionism legitimizes indirectly deadly evictions 
of a progeny while simultaneously forbidding abortion. 
It begins by presenting Block’s Gentleness principle and 
Rothbard’s principle Proportionality separately. Then, it 
compares both principles to analyze how satisfactorily 
each of them deals with some important general prob-
lems of libertarian legal theory. The ‘bubble gum theft’ 
scenario is the main tool for this comparison because 
both authors uses ‘petty theft’ examples to illustrate 
their respective principles. This paper’s conclusions are 
as follows: First, every moment of crime is interconnect-
ed. Second, proportionality applies to every moment of 
crime. Third, that Block’s so-called ‘gentleness principle’ 
is not only redundant to proportionality, but also can-
not be a libertarian principle for two reasons: (1) it im-
plies positive rights and obligations; (2) it presupposes 
Resumo
Este artigo argumenta contra as fundamentações teóricas 
mais importantes que Walter Block usa para defender a sua 
tese de que o eviccionismo legitima expulsões indiretamen-
te fatais à prole enquanto simultaneamente proíbe abortos. 
O artigo começa apresentando o princípio da gentileza de 
Block e, separadamente, o princípio da proporcionalidade 
de Rothbard. Depois, comparam-se ambos os princípios 
para analisar o quão satifatoriamente cada um deles lida 
com alguns importantes problemas gerais da teoria jurídi-
ca do libertarianismo. O cenário do ‘roubo do chiclete’ é a 
principal ferramenta para tal comparação porque ambos 
os autores usam exemplos de ‘roubo de bagatela’ para ilus-
trar os seus respectivos princípios. As conclusões deste arti-
go são as seguintes: Primeiro, cada momento do crime está 
interconectado. Segundo, a proporcionalidade se aplica 
a todos os momentos do crime. Terceiro, que o assim cha-
mado ‘princípio da gentileza’ de Block é não apenas redun-
dante à proporcionalidade, mas também não pode ser um 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF INDIRECTLY DEADLY EVIC-
TIONS
The traditional libertarian stance on abortion has been based on Rothbard’s in-
sight of interpreting this issue as a matter of trespassing. Since the mother is the legiti-
mate owner of her own body, if she considers her progeny1 unwanted, then her progeny 
is a trespasser, and therefore may be aborted. Why? Because by removing the invader 
from her ‘premisses’, she would be acting in self-defense against a criminal trespasser2. 
Block builds Evictionism upon this original libertarian insight. He elaborates on 
it by making a logical distinction between the act of evicting a progeny and the act of 
killing a progeny. Under libertarian law, he argues, the first would be legitimate while 
the second would not. This is, in a nutshell, what he calls Evictionism.
1  I use the term progeny because I believe it to be more neutral. It has several advantages:  it can be used for 
every stage of both pre- and post-natal development; besides, although some may disagree on when human 
rights begin, by using this term they may still recognize the validity of my arguments regardless of their beliefs. 
To contextualize this discussion, Block himself argues from the point of view that human life, with the same 
rights as any other adult human, begins immediately at conception. Meanwhile, Rothbard thinks that a proge-
ny is certainly not yet human before birth.
2  As Rothbard states in Ethics of Liberty, “Abortion should be looked upon, not as ‘murder’ of a living person, 
but as the expulsion of an unwanted invader from the mother’s body”.  He then adds that no humans “have the 
right to be coercive parasites within the body of an unwilling human host”. ROTHBARD, Murray, The Ethics of 
Liberty, 2nd. ed. New York: NYU Press, 1998, p. 98Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20
Liberty%2020191108.pdf>... Also in For a New Liberty, he makes it very clear that “What the mother is doing 
in an abortion is [just] causing an unwanted entity within her body to be ejected from it: If the fetus dies, this 
does not rebut the point that no being has a right to live, unbidden, as a parasite within or upon some person’s 
body” ROTHBARD, Murray, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, 2nd. ed. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig 
von Mises Institute, 2006, p. 132. Available at: https://cdn.mises.org/For%20a%20New%20Liberty%20The%20
Libertarian%20Manifesto_3.pdf.
a deterrence penology. This paper is the first in a series 
of three in an attempt to reform the standard libertarian 
stance on abortion.
Keywords: abortion; evictionism; libertarianism; propor-
tionality; gentleness.
princípio libertário por duas razões: (1) implica em direitos e 
obrigações positivas; (2) pressupõe um penalismo dissuasi-
vo. Este artigo é o primeiro em uma série de três na tentativa 
de reformar o posicionamento padrão do libertarianismo a 
respeito do aborto.
Palavras-chave: aborto; eviccionismo; libertarianismo; 
proporcionalidade; gentileza.
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As to abortion, Block defines it as both acts of evicting and killing (the order 
doesn’t really matter). Thus, he argues that since abortion necessarily kills the progeny, 
it would be equivalent to murder, which makes it illegal under libertarian law.
I agree with Block’s definitions and I believe that these evictionist distinctions 
should be standard in how the issue of abortion should be addressed. However, and 
this is my point of contention with Block, he claims that libertarian law should legiti-
mize evictions that indirectly result in the death of a progeny. In other words, if a mother 
evicts her progeny using a normally non-deadly method, but the child dies anyway, 
then the mother wouldn’t be guilty of ‘murder’. 
Block’s salvo includes allowing a mother to evict her premature progeny imme-
diately and according to her will. In his understanding, a mother’s immediate Eviction 
rights stands even if she could save the progeny’s life by waiting a few days or months 
until the progeny was a bit more mature. In other words, while a mother most certainly 
can’t kill her progeny, she definitely doesn’t have to save her progeny’s life.
Therefore, I will try to argue against the legitimacy of deadly evictions in the 
course of three papers. Here, in the first, I will tackle Block’s theoretical foundations. 
More specifically, his argument that there is a sharp division between two moments of 
crimes, thus making it necessary to have two different regulatory principles. 
In order to dismantle this misconception on Block’s part, I’ll take three steps. 
First, I will explain Block’s principle of gentleness and Rothbard’s principle of propor-
tionality. Second, I will compare them in order to show that the principle of proportion-
ality actually applies to every moment of crime, not just punishment. Third, I will explain 
how ‘gentleness’, understood as a principle, is actually incompatible with libertarian law. 
In my second paper, I will try to find a place for Block’s ‘gentleness’ within liber-
tarianism, although not as a principle, but as a tool of epistemological appraisal. In my 
third paper, I’ll argue that the relationship between a mother and her progeny entails 
in trustee-guardianship duties. This point should make libertarians review the whole 
‘trespassing’ analogy altogether.
As such, the issues regarding proportionality and epistemological appraisal 
have substantial implications within libertarian legal theory and beyond, since they are 
a part of all legal systems3. Meanwhile, the issue of abortion, being more specific, can 
only be properly addressed after those general aspects have been sufficiently settled. 
Thus, first we must settle on the libertarian stance regarding abortion, and only then 
we’ll be able to compare it with other proposals, as to which best solves this important 
social issue.
3  ROTHBARD, Murray N., The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 85 n. 2.Avail-
able at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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I agree with Block when he says that if we can’t settle the issue of Evictionism 
within the libertarian tradition, then this position has little hope of attaining any rele-
vance in the larger public forum4. Having that in mind, throughout this and the subse-
quent papers, my arguments will begin with the theoretical fundamentals of Libertar-
ianism, then narrow it down to the issue of abortion as understood within Libertarian 
law and finally work toward a wider outreach.
2. BLOCK’S GENTLENESS
I believe that Block’s Evictionism is correct in its initial premises5. What I contend 
is his conclusion that an indirectly deadly eviction should be legitimate. To that extent, 
I hope to engage on an ongoing debate, which has more recently resurfaced in 2010, 
on the Libertarian Papers, with Wisniewski6 and Parr7. These authors had used propor-
tionality to challenge Block’s views Unfortunately, their challenges weren’t properly 
addressed.
Take Wisniewski as an example. He uses Rothbard’s principle of proportionality 
to claim that a deadly eviction of the fetus would be illegitimate because “the amount 
of physical harm done to the fetus […] is grossly disproportionate to the amount of 
4  BLOCK, Walter. Rejoinder to Wisniewski on Evictionism, Round four, FBIM Transactions, v. 2, p. 1–14, jul. 
2014, p. 4.Available at: <https://fbim.meste.org/FBIM_2_2014/R4_01.pdf>
5  These could be listed as follows: 1) The mother considers that the progeny is trespassing; 2) There is an an-
alytical distinction between evicting and killing the progeny; 3) Eviction would be legitimate within libertarian 
tradition, but killing wouldn’t.
6  Cf. WISNIEWSKI, Jakub. A Critique of Block on Abortion and Child Abandonment, Libertarian Papers, v. 2, 
mai. 2010.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2010/lp-2-16.pdf>.; BLOCK, 
Walter. Rejoinder to Wisniewski on Abortion, Libertarian Papers, v. 2, p. 1–9, nov. 2010.Available at: <http://
libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2010/lp-2-32.pdf>; WIŚNIEWSKI, Jakub Bożydar. Rejoin-
der to Block’s Defense of Evictionism, Libertarian Papers, v. 2, p. 1–7, nov. 2010.; BLOCK, Walter. Response 
to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 2011, p. 3.Available at: <http://
libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>; WIŚNIEWSKI, Jakub Bożydar. Response to 
Block on Abortion, Round Three, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–6, mar. 2011.Available at: <http://libertarianpa-
pers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-37.pdf>; BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, 
Round Three, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–21, dez. 2011.;, WISNIEWSKI, Jakub. Abortion, Libertarianism, and 
Evictionism: A Last Word, Libertarian Papers, v. 5, p. 1–10, jun. 2013.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.
org/wp-content/uploads/article/2013/lp-5-1-6.pdf>.; BLOCK, Walter. Rejoinder to Wisniewski on Evictionism, 
Round four, FBIM Transactions, v. 2, p. 1–14, jul. 2014.Available at: <https://fbim.meste.org/FBIM_2_2014/
R4_01.pdf>
7  Cf. PARR, Sean. Departurism and the Libertarian Axiom of Gentleness, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–18, 
nov. 2011.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/articles/2011/lp-3-34.pdf>; BLOCK, Walter. Evictionism is 
Libertarian; Departurism is Not: Critical Comment o Parr, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–15, nov. 2012.<http://
libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-36.pdf>; PARR, Sean. Departurism Redeemed - A 
Response to Walter Block’s Evictionism Is Libertarian; Departurism Is Not: Critical Comment on Parr, Journal 
of Peace, Prosperity and Freedom, v. 2, p. 109–123, jan. 2013.<http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/up-
loads/article/2011/lp-3-36.pdf>
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physical harm that the fetus can possibly do to the mother”8. He is excluding, of course, 
those rare situations in which the progeny threatens the mother’s life. A fair point in my 
estimation.
However, Block hastily dismisses Wisniewski’s contention by claiming that he is 
falling victim to a common “category mistake”. Block claims that there is a sharp cate-
gorical distinction between legitimate defense (a) while and (b) after a crime happens. 
Thus, his view is that each single crime has two separate moments.
Given this separation, Block claims that each moment of a crime must be gov-
erned by a different principle of legitimacy. To that extent, he conjures up the ‘principle 
of gentleness’ which, he says, is “part and parcel of the ante punishment9 stage” of a 
crime. Meanwhile, and “in sharp contrast10, proportionality applies, only, to the punish-
ment stage”11. Thus, two distinct moments of a crime, each with its own distinct gov-
erning principle.
But that is not all. Block also adds that it’s actually very common for people to 
commit Wisniewski’s blunder of applying the principle of proportionality to the mo-
ment of self-defense. This happens, he argues, because both principles, although 
sharply contrasting, end up having one and the same goal: “To preclude the victim from 
acting so strongly against the perpetrator that the victim, too, violates the libertarian 
code”12. In other words, both principles forbid a victim from making illegitimate aggres-
sions during a defensive reaction. Thus, two moments, two principles; but one and the 
same purpose.
For example, in Block’s view, to punish a rapist with the death penalty is a dis-
proportionate form of defense, because punishments only apply after the crime has 
already been committed. Comparatively, immediately killing a trespasser, without any 
escalation, is an ‘ungentle’ form of defense because defending oneself happens during 
the crime. Different principles, different moments; but both are illegitimate forms of 
defense for the exact same reason: the excessive use of force13.
8  WIŚNIEWSKI, Jakub Bożydar. Rejoinder to Block’s Defense of Evictionism, Libertarian Papers, v. 2, p. 1–7, 
nov. 2010, p. 2.Available at: < https://cdn.mises.org/-2-37_3.pdf>.
9  I believe that when he says “ante punishment” he means “during the crime” because later he gives this ren-
dition: “confusion between proper punishment after the fact, and, proper defense, during the time the crime 
is being perpetrated” BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Three, Libertarian Papers, 
v. 3, p. 1–21, dez. 2011, p. 4.Available at: < http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-
3-37.pdf>
10  Except when stated otherwise, every emphasis in citations are mine.
11  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 
2011, p. 3.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>
12  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 
2011, p. 3. Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>
13  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 
2011, p. 3.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>
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But what is this so-called ‘principle of gentleness’? It functions as an ‘algorithm’ 
of gradual escalation in the defensive use of force. According to Block, a defensive party 
may ultimately do whatever is necessary to stop a crime. But first, it must all begin with 
the ‘gentlest’ method of self-defense. Therefore, a victim may only gradually increase 
the level of defensive ‘roughness’ and only if gentler methods have been proven to be 
futile.
So far, so good. Unfortunately, this is not Block’ final word on ‘gentleness’. Ac-
cording to him, if there is “no guarantee that [a] rubber bullet (or a net) will halt the 
perpetrator in his tracks”14, then a deadly gun could be used immediately against a tres-
passer, without the requirement of any other intermediate steps of gentle escalation. 
This far, not so good anymore. For this last point muddles the waters quite a bit.
Yes, it’s true that crimes can be quite complex. But a simple scenario such as the 
one above is already enough to show serious cracks on Block’s process of gentle escala-
tion. First of all, why should rubber bullets be considered the ‘gentlest manner possible’ 
to stop a crime15? Furthermore, even if rubber bullets are, indeed, the gentlest method 
available, why could the victim jump straight to normal bullets without trying out any 
other intermediary steps of escalation? Finally, how much warranted does one need to 
be regarding the (in)sufficiency of a given method of self-defense? Notice that none of 
these three questions are minor epistemological problems, but very difficult to settle.
So, what’s the real problem here? If I had to guess, I would say that Block was so 
much focused on dismissing proportionality’s imposition of a maximum limit of defen-
sive force that he forgot to consider to address any minimum and intermediary limits. 
By the looks of it, even if we accept that there are no maximum limits for self-defense, it 
seems that gentleness still needs proportionality in order to establish the upper limits 
of the first and intermediary steps of escalation, until the criminal’s actions is finally 
interrupted.
Damning as this epistemological problem may be, what’s up next is even worse. 
Things start to get really trickier when Block claims that “not abiding by the ‘gentlest 
manner possible’ principle”16,   is, in itself, a crime. Now, this is truly problematic. Here 
Block seems to turn gentleness into a positive obligation towards others, but Libertarian 
principles must be strictly negative. In fact, Libertarianism rejects any kind of gratu-
itously positive obligation, or rights, towards any non-contracting parties17. 
14  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 
2011, p. 4.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>
15  Block uses the caveat ‘the gentlest way possible’ consistent with stopping a crime. Nonetheless, it is perfectly 
consistent to stop a crime with bare hands or even through dialogue and persuasive argumentation.
16  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 
2011, p. 4.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>
17  In case you are not familiarized with the libertarian distinction between positive or negative rights and 
obligations, here is a summary:  “No man can therefore have a “right’’ to compel someone to do a positive act, 
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Besides all of these problems with the theoretical foundation of the gentleness 
principle, which are general, we still have to talk about the specific problems of indirect-
ly deadly evictions. Block’s critics frame it as akin to shooting a wandering, unintentional 
trespasser with a bazooka. Atrociously surreal, isn’t it?
Still, you might be surprised to find out that Block ultimately agrees with his crit-
ics’ description. And, yet, he holds that it would still “be justified for the property owner 
to kill the trespasser”18. Hardly any gentleness in that, wouldn’t you say?
Curiously enough, Block meticulously claims that one can’t just shoot trespass-
ers with a bazooka immediately. That would actually incur in the crime of being way 
too ‘ungentle’ against criminals. First, a victim must follow his algorithm of gentle es-
calation. Then, and only then, may the trespasser be blown away. After all, if you must 
overkill because it’s is the only, or the gentlest, immediately effective method of self-de-
fense against a minor crime, you might as well do it with style19!
Jokes aside, there are at least major two problems here in how Block justifies his 
views. The first is his claim regarding a sharp contrast between the moments of crime, 
such that each is governed by sharply distinct principles. The second is his claim that, 
ultimately, there isn’t a fixed maximum limit to force in legitimate self-defense.
Therefore, I will now focus on the first, namely, Block’s sharp division between 
self-defense and punishment and his confinement of proportionality to punishment20. 
Against Block, I will argue that proportionality actually applies to every moment of a 
crime. But in order to expose my arguments, I’ll first have to try to show how Rothbard 
himself understands the principle of proportionality.
3. ROTHBARD’S PROPORTIONALITY
Rothbard opens up the Punishment and Proportionality chapter of his Ethics of 
Liberty by talking about his ‘theory of proportionality’ already in the first paragraph. 
for in that case the compulsion violates the right of person or property of the individual being coerced […] in 
the free society, no man may be saddled with the legal obligation to do anything for another, since that would 
invade the former’s rights; the only legal obligation one man has to another is to respect the other man’s 
rights.  ROTHBARD, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 100.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20
Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
18  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 
2011, p. 4.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>
19  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Two, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–13, mar. 
2011, p. 4.Available at: <http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-4.pdf>
20  In his own words, “I draw a sharp distinction between what a target may properly do to defend himself from 
an imminent or ongoing attack (pretty much anything within reason necessary to safeguard himself assuming 
he confines his reactive violence to the attacker) and what punishment may be inflicted on the perpetrator 
afterwards. As to the latter, I maintain that proportional punishment is the only response compatible with the 
libertarian philosophy.” BLOCK, Rejoinder to Wisniewski on Evictionism, Round four, p. 4.Available at: <https://
fbim.meste.org/FBIM_2_2014/R4_01.pdf>
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There, we learn that this theory deals with the criminal’s actions and not with the victim’s 
reactions. In his own words, “the criminal loses his rights to the extent that [the criminal] 
deprives [the victim] of his rights”21. I believe that this is already a strong indication that 
proportionality is an active concern since the beginning of any criminal activity.
In fact, while it’s true that he didn’t name it as such, I will argue that Rothbard 
had already talked about this broader view of proportionality in his immediately pre-
ceding chapter on Self-defense. While analyzing the use of force in self-defense, Roth-
bard argued that it must be constrained within limits proportional to the aggressive 
force of a criminal.
Take, for instance, when Rothbard asks the rhetorical question regarding how 
“extensive is a man’s right of self-defense” and his reply that it only goes “up to the point at 
which [the criminal] begins to infringe the property rights of someone else”22. Here we 
have ‘proportional limits’ being applied to self-defense. Furthermore, he adds that if a 
victim extrapolates these limits, then the victim’s so-called ‘defense’ would actually “in 
itself constitute a criminal invasion of the property of some other man, [who, in turn,] 
could properly defend himself against”23 victim’s excessive ‘defense’. Thus, the prohibi-
tion against an extrapolation of force beyond ‘proportional limits’ is the same, either 
during self-defense or punishment.
This is so because, in Rothbard’s view, proportionality in self-defense and in 
punishment are actually just two specific instances of a more general rule: that of “pro-
portionality in crime”. This general rule follows from the fact that libertarian law is pri-
mordially about what a criminal has negatively given up through aggressive actions, 
not about what a victim may positively do as means of a defensive reaction. The ratio-
nale behind itis clearly stated in the following passage, where Rothbard explains that 
proportionality is to be seen as a fundamental rule of crime:
On what basis must we hold that a minuscule invasion of another’s property lays one for-
feit to the total loss of one’s own? I propose another24fundamental rule regarding crime: 
the criminal, or invader, loses his own right to the extent that he has deprived another 
man of his. If a man deprives another man of some of his self-ownership or its extension 
in physical property, to that extent does he lose his own rights.25
21  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 85.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
22  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 77.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
23  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 77.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
24  The other fundamental rule of crime is the Non-Agreession Principle (NAP).
25  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 80.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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Once again, and as we saw above, although Rothbard doesn’t explicitly call it by 
its name, he is clearly describing proportionality. Moreover, by focusing on the crimi-
nal’s actions, he levels proportionality with the Non-Aggression Principle, making them 
two complementary fundamental rules of crime in libertarianism.
This underlying aspect of proportionality, which underpins every moment of a 
crime, becomes clearer when Rothbard adds that “from this [fundamental] principle [of 
crime] immediately derives the proportionality theory of punishment — best summed 
up in the old adage: ‘let the punishment fit the crime’26”.  This means that the propor-
tionality of punishment isn’t just an ad hoc solution. Actually, it derives from a more fun-
damental and perennial rule. The only reason why punishment must be proportional 
is because the criminal had only lost his own rights in proportion to the severity of the 
aggressions. 
So, with that in mind, we are now in a position to better understand why Roth-
bard began his chapter on Punishment and Proportionality as he did. In the very first 
paragraph Rothbard states that he had already advanced “the view that the criminal 
loses his rights to the extent that he deprives another of his rights”27 and he expressively 
names it as “the theory of ‘proportionality”28. Thus, the proportionality regarding a crim-
inal’s loss of rights connects both the proportionally of self-defense and of punishment. 
Therefore, Rothbard leave Block no wiggle room to confine proportionality strictly to 
punishment.
4. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF CRIME
Now that I have presented Block’s gentleness and Rothbard’s proportionality, it 
is time to compare them so we can see how each principle deals with the unavoidable 
legal problem of legitimizing defensive force, both in self-defense and punishment.
Block had argued that while an inflexible maximum limit to punishment makes 
sense, there couldn’t be an inflexible maximum limit of force in self-defense. Thus, and 
sidestepping proportionality, he sets up ‘gentleness’ to curb the absurd cases of instant-
ly overkilling criminals. Even so, Block argues that a victim must always have the right 
to stop an ongoing crime. Thus, his algorithm of gradual escalation allows a victim to 
eventually use maximum force against a minimally invasive crime, if that’s what it takes.
However, as it was established above, Rothbard’s principle of proportionality 
actually regulates both self-defense and punishment. This is because both modes of 
26  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 80-81.Available 
at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
27  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 85.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
28  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 85.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
CEDRIC JOHN AYRES
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 2, p. 407-433, maio/ago. 2021.416 
defense derive their legitimacy from a more general, and more fundamental, rule of 
crime. This fundamental rule states that a criminal gives up his own rights proportion-
ally to that of his aggressions. This, as we see, puts Block’s interpretation in an awkward 
position.
Aside from that, Block’s view is also problematic on other accounts. But before 
we continue, I must first try to fully expose how closely tied together self-defense and 
punishment actually are. It is not that the proportionality of crime applies in parallel to 
both modes of defense, making them only indirectly connected to each other. In truth, 
they are directly connected in such a way that the subsequent moment of punishment 
is essentially subordinated to the previous moment of self-defense. 
As Rothbard himself puts it, the relationship the moments of crime is such that 
“all rights of punishment derive from the victim’s right of self-defense”29. This means that 
the only reason why there is a maximum limit in the proportionality of punishment 
is because it is determined by a preexisting maximum limit in the proportionality of 
self-defense. 
That being so, it is impossible to confine the principle of proportionality to pun-
ishment only. Actually, there is a transitional normative order regarding the application 
of proportionality which follows this hierarchy: (1) in crime; (2) in self-defense; (3) and, 
finally, in punishment.
Thus, since Block already recognizes proportionality as a fundamental principle 
of punishment30, he is bound to also accept this hierarchical order. There is no other way 
around it as there is no sharp contrast between them. 
To put it in more precise terms, the legitimacy of future punishment depends 
on the legitimacy of present self-defense. Which, in turn, depends on what rights has 
the criminal given up by his aggressive behavior. Consequently, ‘punishment’ is nothing 
more than the temporal extension of ‘self-defense’, but exercised by other means. 
Anyhow, this temporal connection between moments still needs further clarifi-
cation. Under libertarian law, ‘self-defense’ is a broader, more inclusive concept. It may 
also imply the defense of a third party (not just yourself) as well as of any property (not 
just the self). In other words, if we are to be strict in our word choice, in the composite 
expression ‘self-defense’, the term ‘self’ is merely accidental, while ‘defense’ is essential. 
As such, there are at least two modes of ‘defense’. One happens during the crime, 
in the form of an immediate thwarting of an aggression. The other happens after the 
29  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 90.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
30  In his own words: “I reiterate: there is certainly “proportionality built into” libertarian punishment theory, 
but it is not at all “built into” the NAP. That is, the punishment must be proportional to the crime, but there is no 
such requirement that rests on the victim for his self-defense during the commission of the crime.”BLOCK, Wal-
ter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Three, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–21, dez. 2011, p. 3.Avail-
able at: < http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-37.pdf>
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crime, in the form of later restitution31 for the losses suffered. Nonetheless, both are just 
different types of defense and, as such, there is no need for different principles at differ-
ent moments of a crime. Since proportionality governs defense, it is already enough to 
govern both modes.  There is no need for ‘gentleness’ or any other competing principle.
The point is that, under libertarian law, it matters less how the defense is actually 
accomplished, but rather that justice is served32. Thus, it is up to the victim to choose 
whichever method of defense seems the most convenient. Obviously, depending on 
the crime being committed, each defensive method will have different costs, risks and 
yields. And this choice also includes when such defensive measures are to take place.
 Ultimately, a victim may decide what’s in his or hers own best interest at each 
specific situation. At least theoretically, I mean, for sometimes there may be not much 
of an option33. In spite of that, to arbitrarily force one legitimate method of defense over 
another is to impose a positive obligation, and contrary to the spirit of the Libertarian 
code of law. As Rothbard explains it, no man has “a ‘right’ to compel someone to do a 
positive act, for in that case the compulsion violates the right of person or property of 
the individual being coerced”34. Thus, positing an obligation for victims to use the ‘gen-
tlest’ method of self-defense when other ‘rougher-yet-still-proportional’ methods avail-
able are just as legitimate, is the logically equivalent of establishing the ‘positive rights’ 
for criminals to be treated in the gentlest manner possible. This absurd consequence of 
Block’s principle of gentleness makes it unacceptable to Libertarianism.
Since the purpose of punishments in Libertarian law is to fulfill the criminal’s 
‘debt’ to the victim35, we can infer that every moment of a crime, is in a way, logically in-
terconnected. After all, this ‘debt’ could be collected immediately, in the form of self-de-
fense; or afterwards, through punishment36. Thus, since the goal of a legitimate defense 
31  As Rothbard explains: “for proportionate punishment to be levied we would also have to add more than 
double so as to compensate the victim in some way for the uncertain and fearful aspects of his particular or-
deal” ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 89.Available 
at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
32  As long as no other crimes are being committed in the process of self-defense, of course. But I’ll address 
this point later in sections 6 and 8.
33  For example: the victim may suffer a sneak attack or come home to find a burglary took place.
34  ROTHBARD, The Ethics of Liberty, p. 100.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20
Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
35  “Punishment must be not on paying one’s debt to “society,” whatever that may mean, but in paying one’s 
“debt’’ to the victim. ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 
86.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
36  Perhaps you are unfamiliar with libertarian theory of law and this idea of ‘debt’ collection in self-defense 
sounds weird to you. I will briefly address this issue further ahead when I talk about the purely ‘retributive’ char-
acteristic of libertarian law, but if you want to further explore, c.f. ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, 
New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 86-89.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20
of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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is to non-aggressively collect debt, we may conclude the principle of proportionality 
must persists through any type of defense and at any moment of crime37. 
Now that we have a better understanding of the temporal connection between 
the moments of a crime, it will make sense to see that Rothbard used one and the same 
example to explore how proportionality works in both ‘self-defense’ and ‘punishment’. 
The hypothetical dilemma is quite simple: Can a store clerk shoot and kill a child who 
steals bubble gum from his store as a legitimate form of self-defense?
Fortunately for us, Block also addresses the same kind of example throughout 
his discussion with his critics. However, you might be surprised to find out that Block’s 
answer to this thought experiment is quite the opposite of Rothbard’s. Thus, the ‘bub-
ble gum theft’ is the best tool that we have to contrast Rothbard’s proportionality and 
Block’s gentleness in how they undellrstand the legitimacy of self-defense.
5. HOW HARMFUL CAN A BUBBLE GUM THIEF REALLY BE?
The first time Rothbard mentions the bubble gum theft example is in his chapter 
on Self-defense. He uses it to argue against maximalism in self-defense, a position Roth-
bard deems to suffer “from a grotesque lack of proportion”38.Notice that he is talking 
about proportion in self-defense, not ‘gentleness’ nor ‘punishment’. Keep that in mind.
According to Rothbard, maximalism’s mistake lies in prioritizing the victims right 
of self-defense at the cost of the criminals’ rights. Under the bubble gum theft sce-
nario, for example, this means that “by concentrating on the storekeeper’s right to his 
bubble gum, [the maximalist] totally ignores another highly precious property-right: 
every man’s — including the urchin’s — right of self-ownership”39. In other words, the 
defensive rights of the victim must also be kept in check and not allowed to transgress 
against the legitimate rights of a criminal. But what rights does a criminal have anyway? 
Well, one thing is for certain, these rights cannot be the same as those of an innocent 
person.
If it were up to the maximalists, “a minuscule invasion of another’s property 
lays one forfeit to the total loss of one’s own”40. Imagine life under that rule: if you feel 
like killing someone legally, just put yourself in the way of harms way and hope that 
37  Perhaps Block would claim that ‘debt collecting’ is only a part of punishment, while self-defense only re-
gards ‘stopping crime’. We will address this point later when we talk about ‘threats’.
38  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 80.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
39  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 80.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
40  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 80.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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someone ends up causing any minor aggressions against you41. But Rothbard outright 
rejects maximalism. In his view, a criminal loses42 his rights only proportionately to the 
aggressions that he made against the rights of others. It’s this loss of rights by the crim-
inal what informs how much defensive force is legitimate Thus, the proportionality of 
defense begins weighing down instantly, as soon as the criminal starts his aggression, 
and it doesn’t have to wait for end ofa crime and for beginning of a punishment43.
The whole rationale behind this is neatly exposed in the following passage. 
Here, Rothbard concludes his take on the bubble gum scenario, shows the role of pro-
portionality in the libertarian legal system and how it fits neatly with common sense: 
We conclude that the shopkeeper’s shooting of the erring lad went beyond this propor-
tionate loss of rights, to wounding or killing the criminal; this going beyond is in itself 
an invasion of the property right in his own person of the bubble gum thief. In fact, the 
storekeeper has become a far greater criminal than the thief, for he has killed or wound-
ed his victim — a far graver invasion of another’s rights than the original shoplifting.44
This conclusion, which was exposed in the chapter on Self-defense, undoubtedly 
shows that proportionality doesn’t just spring out of nowhere, ad hoc, at the moment of 
punishment. As we have emphasized, proportionality is already at play since the begin-
ning of the entire process. It begins with the criminal’s proportionate loss of rights, then 
it passes to the issue of proportionate self-defense and, finally, to that of a proportionate 
punishment. To put itin an organized fashion, here is how proportionality works:
a. First, an aggression harms a limited amount of property rights of an inno-
cent person;
b. Second, the criminal gives up his own rights in proportion to the amount of 
rights against which he has transgressed (taking into account both restitu-
tion and compensation);
c. Thence, the legitimate limits of force in self-defense are proportionately 
established;
41  Here I have in mind South Park’s episode ‘World War Zimmerman’, which makes the perfect satire against 
the maximalism position in regards to ‘standing one’s ground’ as a form of self-defense against the crime of 
‘trespassing’.
42  If it seems weird to talk about ‘losing’ rights, you may prefer to read it as ‘suspend’. After all, in most cases, it 
wouldn’t be proportional for a criminal to actually ‘lose’ his right ‘forever’ just because he caused a temporary 
harm. Proportionality stats that a temporary and partial harm calls for a temporary and partial loss, or suspen-
sion.
43  Supposing it had to wait for the crime to ‘finish’ and that the moments of crimes are strictly distinct, how 
does one transition into the other? Furthermore, are there yet other moment of crime in-between that of 
self-defense and punishment? I will address these issues in my next paper, when I try to explain the epistemolog-
ical appraisal.
44 ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 81.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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d. Finally, based on the proportional rights of self-defense, it becomes possible 
to determine the proportional rights of legitimate punishment.
Actually, this fourth step only comes to play more clearly in the chapter on Pun-
ishment and Proportionality. There, Rothbard returns to the same bubble gum scenario, 
thus further cements through proportionality this connection between the moments 
of self-defense and punishment. So, to better understand this fourth step, we must first 
read the next passage attentively and see how proportionality plays the exactly same 
role in the moment of punishment as it had played in the moment of self-defense:
a criminal would only lose his right to life if he had first deprived some victim of that same 
right. it would not be permissible, then, for a merchant whose bubble gum had been sto-
len, to execute the convicted bubble gum thief. If he did so, then he, the merchant, would 
be an unjustifiable murderer, who could be brought to the bar of justice by the heirs or 
assigns of the bubble gum thief.45
This passage is immensely important because it presupposes the idea that all 
rights of punishment derive from the rights of self-defense46. Perhaps reverse-engi-
neering the rationale will help us leave no stones unturned. Since it is not legitimate 
to kill a petty thief during the crime as a form of self-defense47, then, evidently, it is also 
not legitimate to kill him after the crime as a form of punishment. However, in both 
cases, the ultimate justification of this lack of proportionality is based on the criminal’s 
actions, for such a small theft doesn’t not entail in the loss of one’s own life. Thus, if a 
clerk tries to kill a kid to save his gum from being stolen, this is an aggression and that 
kid could kill the murderous clerk in legitimate self-defense. Consequently, if the kid had 
the right to kill the clerk in self-defense, then the ‘bar of justice’ could also do it as legit-
imate punishment.
6. POSITIVE DEFENSE OR NEGATIVE OFFENSE?
Notwithstanding Rothbard’s arguments, Block subverts this fundamental order 
of proportionality. This subversion ultimately leads to an attenuates ‘maximalism’ in 
self-defense. Block’s gentleness imposes on the victim the positive obligation of follow-
ing an algorithm of escalation. Which means, in other words, that the criminal has the 
45  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 85.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
46  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 90.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
47  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 80.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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positive right of being treated in the gentlest way possible48. Even so, this positive pro-
scription is nothing more than a utilitarian attenuation of ‘maximalism’, not a rejection. 
Yes, it’s true that the victim is forced to undergo a process of gradual escalation, but still, 
in the end of the process, a victim is allowed to unleash maximum force even against a 
minimal crime49.
Since Block addresses the same type of ‘petty theft’ examples as the one dis-
cussed by Rothbard, I’ll show Block’s rendition in its entirety. Thus, we’ll be able to com-
pare how both proposals, gentleness and proportionality, address to the same scenario:
I speak only for myself when I say that the only time this would be justified is if the only 
way the shopkeeper could stop the theft is by shooting. For example, he might be a para-
plegic with only the trigger finger functioning. For the libertarian, property rights are 
sacrosanct. We cannot support children stealing candy bars; if we do, utilitarian point 
coming up, the practice will become widespread. Assuming the child is young enough 
not to constitute a threat, the mighty presumption is that the able-bodied property own-
er will be able to stop the theft with far less violence than the proverbial shot in the back; 
certainly, such a baby constitutes no threat of bodily harm. The reason he may do so to 
an adult, or, even, an armed child50, is that, then, there is a threat of dire consequences, 
and if property rights are to be upheld, then force, yes, deadly force, is justified.51
Indeed, we call all rejoice that Block speaks only for himself! While he is correct 
in stating that property rights are sacrosanct for libertarianism, he is wrong in extend-
ing this characteristic to the rights of defense. Actually, these two types or rights are 
different aspects of Libertarianism. While property rights are absolute, the rights of de-
fense must always be proportionally relative to the crime against which it is reacting. 
Therefore, an absolute defensive reaction would only be legitimate against an absolute 
criminal action.
48  Here it might be opportune to remember that “one vital distinction between a genuine and a spurious 
‘right’ is that the former requires no positive action by anyone except noninterference” ROTHBARD, Murray N. 
The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 249.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/
The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.. But I will further elaborate this point in my next paper, 
when I talk about epistemological appraisal.
49  We’ll examine this point in the next section.
50  I certainly don’t know why Block armed this hypothetical child. As we will explore in my next paper when I 
address the issue of threats, libertarian theory is clear in assuming that an overt threat is akin to the crime itself. 
As Rothbard puts it: “suppose someone approaches you on the street, whips out a gun, and demands your 
wallet. He might not have molested you physically during this encounter, but he has extracted money from 
you on the basis of a direct, overt threat that he would shoot you if you disobeyed his commands. He has used 
the threat of invasion to obtain your obedience to his commands, and this is equivalent to the invasion itself.” ROTH-
BARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 78.Available at: <https://
cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>..
51  BLOCK, Walter. Abortion Once Again: a response to Feser, Goodwin, Mosquito, Sadowsky, Vance and Wat-
kins, Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, v. 4, n. 1, p. 11–41, jan. 2017, p. 20.Available at: <http://revis-
tas.ufpr.br/rinc/article/view/50328>
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In order to expose the mistake in Block’s deduction, I will use as a counter-exam-
ple an analogous ‘petty theft’ scenario which he used elsewhere. This time, Block claims 
that the (in)justice of a punishment is not affected by the eventual consequences of 
actually applying that punishment, whatever it may be.
He asks us to suppose that a $100 fine is to be deemed a just and proportion-
ate punishment against the crime of stealing a candy bar. If that’s so, “justice thought 
the heavens fall” — says Block. According to him, it wouldn’t matter if fifty ‘proverbial’ 
people simply “perish” as a consequence of actually punishing the criminal because 
“proportionality applies to ex post punishment, but not at all to ex ante violations of the 
NAP. QED”52. Unfortunately for him, that’s not a ‘demonstration’ at all!
Abstract hypotheticals oftentimes lack the concreteness needed for making val-
id analogies. In this specific case, what exactly does Block mean when he says that fifty 
people will “perish”53?  This omitted information is pivotal for us to judge his hypotheti-
cal example. After all, people don’t magically vanish all of a sudden. 
If Block means to say that collecting $100 dollars requires a method of punish-
ment (or even self-defense) which involve an aggression against fifty innocent people, 
then this punishment is actually unjust. Rothbard himself argues that it is absolutely 
illegitimate “to commit aggressive violence against innocent third parties in the course 
of his legitimate defense”54.  Thus, justice must hold heavens from falling down, if the fall 
of heavens implies in committing aggressions against an innocent third party.
I believe that Block’s greatest mistake lies in his emphasis on the positive rights of 
self-defense. Whereas, in truth, the aspect of property rights which libertarian law de-
clares as sacrosanct is actually is the negative prohibition of aggressive offenses against 
the innocent. In other words, libertarianism is above all ‘against crime’, not ‘for defense’.
Indeed, negative prohibition is the hallmark of libertarian law. Rothbard is crystal 
clear when it comes to the ‘negative limits’ of defensive force in the following passage: 
“the rule prohibiting violence against the persons or property of innocent men is absolute; 
it holds regardless of the subjective motives for the aggression.”55. This rule is nothing 
more than the NAP. Thus, it holds even if the subjective motive for using aggressive vi-
olence is the that of preserving one’s own property rights in the course of self-defense. 
Moreover, just in case Block tries to dismiss this point by appealing once again 
to his arbitrary distinction between self-defense and punishment, I’ll showcase here a 
52  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Three, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–21, dez. 
2011, p. 3.Available at: < http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-37.pdf>
53  BLOCK, Walter. Response to Wisniewski on Abortion, Round Three, Libertarian Papers, v. 3, p. 1–21, dez. 
2011, p. 3.Available at: < http://libertarianpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/article/2011/lp-3-37.pdf>
54  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 189.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
55  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 189.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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passage in which Rothbard unambiguously applies the same prohibition against ag-
gressions to the moment of self-defense: “no man, in an attempt to exercise his right of 
self-defense, may coerce anyone else into defending him. For that would mean that the 
defender himself would be a criminal invader of the rights of others”56.  In other words, 
any aggressive attack against an innocent person — even for defensive reasons and 
even to uphold property rights — is illegitimate. Thus, there is no such a thing as a posi-
tive right of defense. Actually, the Libertarian legal prohibition against aggressions holds 
no matter when, why and how. 
One might protest that these passages only forbid aggressions and coercions 
against an innocent third party. Meanwhile, this discussion with Block regards criminals 
who, by definition, aren’t innocent. Does it mean that the libertarian negative prohibi-
tion against aggressions doesn’t apply to criminals? Are we allowed treat criminals as 
we wish in order to benefit a victim’s defensive effort? Let us examine it further.
7. INNOCENCE: RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE?
The truth is that, in libertarian law, no one could ever be an absolute criminal. 
Guilt is necessarily related to a specific crime against a specific victim. Therefore, the crim-
inal only loses his rights in proportion to his specific aggressions. No criminal ever “loses 
all of his rights”57 just because he committed a single offense against a single victim. 
And this, my dear reader, is the ultimate reason of why in libertarianism any maximalism 
is wrong regardless if it is ‘gentle’ or not.
Think about it, after all, this point of libertarianism is very much in tone with 
common sense. No one is ever guilty of every conceivable crime against every conceiv-
able victim. As a matter of fact, person ‘A’ might be guilty of committing crime ‘X’ against 
victim ‘B’ while simultaneously being innocent of crime ‘Y’ against victim ‘C’. 
Let’s use the same bubble gum theft example in order to illustrate it. We could 
say that, indeed, that ‘damned’ kid is guilty of the crime of shoplifting against the store 
clerk. However, the same kid is also innocent of killing (or raping, defrauding, kidnaping, 
etc.) the same clerk (and also completely innocent in relation to everyone else). 
The corollary of the relativity of guilt is twofold. First, a petty thief is innocent in 
relation to the crime of murder; therefore, killing the kid is illegitimate regardless if it is 
in self-defense or punishment. Second, the crime was only against the clerk’s property 
rights and nobody else’s; therefore, if the clerk doesn’t wish to pursue defense, no one 
else could override his wishes and impose a violent reprimand (or punishment) on the 
kid.
56  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 83.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
57  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 80.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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This relativity of guilt is actually derived from two important fundamental char-
acteristics of libertarian law. The first is methodological individualism, which is perme-
ates every aspect of libertarian theory, not being restricted to its legal issues58. The sec-
ond is Libertarianism’s strictly retributionist theory of justice. Let’s see them.
Methodological individualism makes Libertarianism rejects crimes against ‘soci-
ety’. From the fact that only individuals act59, it follows that only individuals commit 
crimes and that only individuals are victims. As such, it is up to the victim (or the victim’s 
heirs) to choose whether or not to press charges against a crime. Additionally, restitu-
tion and retribution are owed to the victim only (or the victim’s heirs). In sum, there are 
no such things as collective guilt, collective crimes or collective victims. Thus, society 
can’t override one’s decision regarding how one chooses to pursue his own rights of 
defense60.
Meanwhile, the strictly retributionist aspect of libertarian law makes this theory 
outright reject any reasons regarding rehabilitation or deterrence in an analysis to de-
termine the legitimate use of defensive force in a situation. Since Block uses deterrence 
to justify his gentleness ‘principle’, I will further elaborate this point in the next section.
8. PROPORTIONAL RETRIBUTION OR GENTLE DETERRENCE?
I have already gone over on how the principle of proportionality is a legal con-
stant, such that it applies to every type of defense and to every moment of crime. Fur-
thermore, I have just talked about how proportionality in defense is, first and foremost, 
negatively determined by taking in consideration what rights a criminal has given up 
for his aggressive behavior. Therefore, defense cannot be understood as the victim’s 
positive right of self-preservation but as a negative prohibition against aggressions. 
This means that, if defense is not a positive right, then it is illegal to aggress 
against someone else’s legitimate property rights, even if the goal is to stop a crime. 
Such prohibition protects the remaining property rights of a criminal which are still 
legitimate.
58  Cf. VON MISES, Ludwig. Human action: a treatise on economics, Scholar’s ed. Auburn, Ala: Ludwig Von 
Mises Institute, 1998, p. 21.
59  One could also say ‘groups’ of individuals. But, nonetheless, groups must be understood as are reducible 
to individuals. Cf. ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 
55.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
60  C.f.: “The legal concept of “crime” is confined to offenses against the State or Community. lt will be seen 
below that we deny the latter concept altogether, with all legally punishable offenses confined to invasions 
of the person or property of other individuals. In short, in the libertarian conception, its “crimes” correspond 
to legally designated “torts,” although there is no particular reason for redress or punishment to be confined 
to monetary payment, as was the case in ancient tort law.” ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New 
York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 51, n.2.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20
Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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To continue my argument, I must now show how the justification for defensive 
reaction in Libertarianism is its strictly retributionist objective. This means that deter-
rence or rehabilitation may not be used as reasons to legally estipulate the proportion-
ality of force at any level, be it of a crime, of defense, or of punishment.
For example, in Block’s rendition of the bubble gum theft there is the conse-
quentialist claim that “we cannot support children stealing candy bars; if we do, utilitar-
ian point coming up, the practice will become widespread”61. Yes, Block seriously brings 
this ‘ominous’ scenario of widespread candy theft as a justification for allowing clerks to 
‘gently’ shoot children in the back62. 
First of all, there is no doubt that in Libertarianism any theft is illegitimate. But, 
since Block brought up the issue of consequentialist claims, allow me to address it brief-
ly. To be frank, realistically speaking, so what if juvenile candy theft becomes ‘rampant’? 
In the worst-case scenario, shops would simply stop selling candy in places that are ac-
cessible to children. There we go, the problem is solved and society is saved. The truth is 
that, contrarily to Block’s beliefs, we certainly could support some juvenile theft without 
having to kill any children in order to prevent the fall of all civil society. 
In either case, Libertarianism is beyond utilitarian points. What is really import-
ant here, what I wish to highlight, is that ‘defense’ is not limited to the immediate mo-
ment of crime. Actually, defensive reaction extends to both before and after the crim-
inal’s action. Therefore, even if there is a situation in which it is indeed impossible for 
a victim to use proportional methods of self-defense during a crime, the victim must 
still abnegate to using proportional methods of defense either before or after a crime 
happens.
Before the infamous candy heist takes place, the owner could take preemptive 
defensive precautions against such ‘barbaric’ children. For example, he could bar their 
entrance or maybe even inspect children’s pockets before allowing them to leave the 
store. Subsequently, after the crime has taken place, it’s possible to catch and pun-
ish those brats. So, once again, the problem is solved and society is saved all within 
proportionality.
The point is that no social chaos would emerge just because clerks were for-
bidden to shoot kids in the back, while they were still at range, in order to save their 
precious bubble gum. Here Block is making the classic interventionist mistake of using 
61  BLOCK, Walter. Abortion Once Again: a response to Feser, Goodwin, Mosquito, Sadowsky, Vance and Wat-
kins, Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, v. 4, n. 1, p. 11–41, jan. 2017, p. 20.Available at: <http://revis-
tas.ufpr.br/rinc/article/view/50328>
62  That is to say only if the clerk had ‘gently’ escalated up to the point when shooting becomes the only 
effective way to defend his precious bubble gum, of course. After all, Block is quite moderate with his gentle 
maximalism, unlike the ‘pure maximalism’ of those extremists who allows people to immediately shoot children 
in the back without even giving a fair warning. But then again, even Draco seems gentle when compared to 
those full-blown Maximalists.
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aggressive force in order to fix problems up expediently. However, Libertarianism holds 
that there is no right to use aggressive force in order to reach goals of your own interest 
just because you can’t figure out a ‘non-aggressive’ way of doing so. And this, of course, 
also includes the goal of defending and preserving one’s property rights63.
However, just for the sake of argumentation, let us grant Block’s point. Now, 
imagine yourself in a world where the downfall of all civil society is being caused by 
rampant juvenile candy theft and that these Machiavellian ‘rugrats’ always get away 
scot-free. Well, even if the respecting proportionality ledto such a silly apocalyptical 
scenario, it wouldn’t matter at all. After all, Libertarianism grounds defensive reaction 
strictly on retributive reasons and any arguments based on crime deterrence must be 
rejected64. 
Strictly speaking, in a retributionist penology, the defensive reaction is strictly 
based on the aggression itself. Meanwhile, in a deterrence penology, defense is not 
really answering to an aggression, but preventing the possible consequences of that 
aggression. 
To that regard, Rothbard quotes Robert Gahringer: “An absolute offense requires 
an absolute negation […] a lesser penalty would indicate a less significant crime”65. In 
other words, legitimate defensive force must be proportionally connected to the crime 
itself, not to its eventual consequences. 
We must have in mind that methodological individualism in Libertarianism 
holds that guilt is non-transferrable. However, using deterrence as a justification for 
defense is equivalent to gathering the potential guilt of multiple criminals from a hypo-
thetical future, transferring it to a single present criminal and making him actually pay 
for it. To use our bubble gum example, since Libertarian law is strictly retributive, no 
child shall be actually sacrificed in the now for the potential sins of future others.
This proportionately retributive relationship between the intensity of crime and 
the intensity of defense is precisely what leads Rothbard to state that: “under libertarian 
law, capital punishment would have to be confined strictly to the crime of murder”66. 
63  Think of those in the 19th century who used to argue against the end of slavery while relying on utilitarian 
claim that, supposedly, without slaves it would be impossible to produce enough food for everybody. Libertar-
ianism would answer that “there was only one possible moral solution for the slave question: immediate and 
unconditional abolition, with no compensation to the slavemasters. Indeed, any compensation should have 
been the other way” ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, 
p. 75.Available at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
64  I will further elaborate on the issue of threats in my next paper. However, we have already mentioned that 
in Libertarianism the threat of a crime is on parity with the crime itself. Thus, defense is always reactive because 
to stop an attempt of a murder is getting on parity of getting retribution of the murder itself.  It was not pre-
vention of a future crime, but reaction to a crime that has already happened (namely, the threat of murdering).
65  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 91 n.12.Avail-
able at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
66  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 85.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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Consequently, since the legitimacy of punishment is derived from the legitimacy of 
self-defense, we could also infer that the act of killing in self-defense must also be con-
fined to stopping the crime of murder. Well, at least certainly not to stopping a bubble 
gum theft67.
Fortunately for us, Rothbard addresses this issue of proportional retributive de-
fense and even shows how it applies to a petty theft scenario. This passage, for exam-
ple, seems to be a direct rebuttal of Block’s gentle-yet-maximalist deterrent defense: 
If there were no punishment for crime at all, a great number of people would commit 
petty theft, such as stealing fruit from a fruit-stand. On the other hand, most people have 
a far greater built-in inner objection to themselves committing murder than they have to 
petty shoplifting, and would be far less apt to commit the grosser crime. Therefore, if the 
object of punishment is to deter from crime, then a far greater punishment would be re-
quired for preventing shoplifting than for preventing murder, a system that goes against 
most people’s ethical standards. As a result, with deterrence as the criterion there would 
have to be stringent capital punishment for petty thievery — for the theft of bubble gum 
— while murderers might only incur the penalty of a few months in jail.68
Rothbard’s argument means that the consequentialist benefit of stopping a 
crime can’t ever be used as a legitimate justification for the excessive use of defensive 
force. Therefore, any ‘maximalist’ conception of defense (gentle or not) is a complete 
subversion of the libertarian theory of crime. How so, you might ask?
According to Rothbard, it is because “instead of the punishment ‘fitting the 
crime’ [this relationship between crime and punishment] is now graded in inverse 
proportion to [the crime’s] severity or [punishment] is meted out to the innocent rath-
er than the guilty”69. There we have it, Block’s gentleness commits both of these sins 
against Libertarianism. In order to justify the deterrence of a present crime, gentleness 
(1) inverts the proportions of criminal action and defensive reaction; and (2) metes out 
defensive force against the (relatively) innocent, rather than against the actually guilty. 
I believe that what ultimately led Block to this subversion was his emphasis on 
the positive rights of defense rather than on the negative prohibition of aggressions is. 
Therefore, we will return this point in the next section in hopes that we can interweave 
everything that we have discussed and finally unwind the whole confusion at its source.
67  Perhaps there are crimes so dreadful that, for defensive matters, they may be treated as equivalent to mur-
der. 
68  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 93.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
69  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 94.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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9. THE POSITIVE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS OR THE NEGATIVE PROHIBI-
TION OF CRIMINALS?
Superficially, this distinction between the positive rights of defense and the nega-
tive prohibition of aggressions might seem like academic knit picking on my part. But, as 
a matter of fact, this distinction is crucial to the libertarian theory of law as a whole. Fur-
thermore, understanding it clearly will be essential to understand the debate regarding 
Evictionism and abortion. Therefore, we must contrast these two positions side by side.
On the one hand, if we absolutize the positive right of self-defense, we end up 
with a ‘maximalist’ position. Maximalism — gentle or full-blown — allows the use of 
any amount of force in order to stop any crime while it’s still happening70. On the other 
hand, if we absolutize the negative prohibition of aggressions against the innocent, we 
end up with Rothbard’s ‘proportional’ position. Proportionality prohibits any defensive 
force which is disproportionately more aggressive than the crime itself71. This prohibition 
holds even if, tragically, a victim can’t proportionately stop a crime or punish a criminal.
I hope that by this brief summary of both positions, side by side, was enough 
to ascertain to their mutual incompatibility. That said, I believe that perhaps Block mis-
takenly focused on the victim’s right of self-defense due to a crass confusion between 
what Rothbard calls the ‘theory of the rights of property’ and ‘the theory of criminality’.
First, we have the ‘theory of rights of property’, which establishes that “every 
man has an absolute right to the control and ownership of his own body, and to the un-
used land resources that he finds and transforms”72. So, indeed, here we have an ‘ab-
solute right’ when it comes to the control and the use of legitimate ownership. Notice, 
however, that there is nothing being said about ‘defense’. Like I have argued, property 
rights does not entail in the positive rights of defense or maintenance of said property. 
After all, the positive aspect implies in an aggression against the property of others.
Consequently, it is precisely to address the issue of aggressions that a ‘theory of 
criminality’ becomes necessary. As Rothbard explains, the libertarian theory of criminal-
ity holds that “a criminal is someone who aggresses against such property. Any criminal 
titles to property should be invalidated and turned over to the victim or his heirs”73. This 
passage is important because here we have both principles which compose the fun-
damental rules of crime in Libertarianism. In the first sentence we have the NAP, estab-
lishing that any aggressor is a criminal. In the second sentence we have the Principle 
70  Either immediately, as in full-blown maximalism, or after a process of escalation, as in Block’s gentle rendi-
tion.
71  Because that would incur in an aggression against rights that weren’t given up by the criminal.
72  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 60.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
73  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 60.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
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of Proportionality, which states that only criminal titles to property should be invalidat-
ed74.  In sum, proportionality and the NAP are inexorable partners of crime.
In case there remains any doubt in regards to the relationship of these princi-
ples, perhaps a last analogy will help me illustrate it more clearly. On the one hand, 
the ‘theory of rights of property’ establishes legitimate borders in a map. On the other 
hand, the ‘theory of criminality’ refers to the conditions and criteria which determines 
if a border-crossing legitimate or not. Thus, border-crossing is necessarily relative to 
preexisting borders, which are themselves absolute. 
Furthermore, within the ‘theory of criminality’ we have two principles. While the 
NAP says that ‘invading’ borders is always wrong, the principle of proportionality states 
that suffering a minor incursion doesn’t justify total war against the whole world. The 
reason being that the ‘property’, to which we have rights, is not a single, monolithic and 
all-encompassing entity, but to relative to multiple, distinct and scarce objects. Thus, a 
defensive reaction must be compatible to the aggression in relation to what was actu-
ally invaded and to whom actually invaded.
10. CONCLUSION: PROPORTIONAL EVICTIONISM OR GENTLE 
ABORTION?
The ‘Maximalist’ position claims that it is legitimate to immediately shoot chil-
dren in the back for the crime of stealing a simple bubble gum. In this view, if a person 
criminally takes possession of a single title of property, then, as result, this person loses 
every title of property it currently has, legitimate or not. This loss includes even the crim-
inal’s right to life. To put it bluntly, in a Maximalist world, only voluntary mercy could 
prevent society from laying out death on every criminal.
Block’s self-proclaimed ‘moderation’75 makes him restrain this ‘maximalism’ with 
his so-called ‘principle’ of gentleness. His solution is to positively force a process of grad-
ual escalation in order to avoid the tragedy of defensive overkill from becoming a far 
too common occurrence. This means that every criminal76 has the right to force their 
victims to use the strictly gentlest-yet-efficient method of self-defense. As such, Block 
understands that a noncompliant victim who doesn’t fulfill their positive obligation 
and who uses ‘unnecessary roughness’ against a criminal is himself committing a crime. 
However, Libertarianism outright rejects positive rights or positive obligations, which 
makes gentleness incompatible with a libertarian legal theory.
74  Notice that this is general to crime, it doesn’t matter if it is during self-defense or punishment.
75  In his own words: “I regard myself as a moderate on this question.” BLOCK, Walter E; CEKEREVAC, Zoran. 
Should abortions be criminalized? Rejoinder to Akers, Davies and Shaffer on abortion, FBIM Transactions, v. 2, 
p. 33–44, jan. 2014, p. 4.Available at: <https://fbim.meste.org/FBIM_1_2014/_04.pdf>
76  Or non-criminal, he is a bit ambiguous about this point, but I will return to this point in my next paper 
about the epistemological appraisal.
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Another problem with Block’s gentleness is that it can be seen as a consequen-
tialist compromise in order to salvage ‘maximalism’ from the fierce criticism of good 
old-fashioned common sense. After all, following the algorithm of gentle escalation 
would indeed decrease the number of time that a symbolic child ends up proverbi-
ally shot in the back. However, this means that gentleness is just a method of crime 
deterrence, thus making it once again incompatible with the libertarian theory of crime, 
which sees defense as strictly retributive.
Against Block’s ‘gentle maximalism’, we have explored Rothbard’s proportionali-
ty. As I have argued, proportionality is not limited to punishment, as Block had claimed, 
but it is actually a principle of the general Libertarian ‘theory of crime’. As such, propor-
tionality is a structural aspect of criminal law and thus applies to every moment of crime 
and to every type of defense. Therefore, Block’s gentleness is not only incompatible with 
Libertarianism, but also redundant to proportionality. 
During his debates with his critics on the matter of Evictionism, Block exten-
sively used this arbitrary sharp division between the moments of crime to restrict pro-
portionality only to moment of punishment. This was his ultimate theoretical fallback 
against many critiques against his thesis that indirectly killing a progeny should be legit-
imate under Evictionism. Unfortunately, none of his critics called him out on that, which 
ultimately left this debate without any satisfactory resolution.
I hope that I have done enough to demonstrate that gentleness cannot be a lib-
ertarian principle for the following reasons: it arbitrarily separates logically connected 
moments of a crime; it disregards proportionality; it entails positive rights; and it uses 
deterrence as a justification for self-defense. If I have succeeded in my goal, then we 
have advanced in the purpose of addressing the issue of indirectly deadly evictions. 
However, you may notice that I have not yet proven anything regarding whether 
or not these indirectly deadly evictions are legitimate or not. This paper only intended to 
refute Block’s fundamental premises. Since gentleness is not a principle, the legitima-
cy of a defensive reaction against any crime must be settled by proportionality alone. 
This includes, of course, the crimes of trespassing, which, in turn, include the issue of 
abortion and Evictionism. As such, although this paper plays an important and neces-
sary role in this discussion, it’s also true that I have not as of yet addressed the issue of 
Evictionism per se nor have I argued in against indirectly deadly evictions.
After all, Block might still argue that “there is all the world of difference between 
trespassing into an airplane, and into the body of a person”77. If he is correct in his state-
ment, and that trespassing a body is indeed such a horrendous crime, maybe even akin 
77  BLOCK, Walter. Abortion Once Again: a response to Feser, Goodwin, Mosquito, Sadowsky, Vance and Wat-
kins, Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, v. 4, n. 1, p. 11–41, jan. 2017, p. 29.Available at: <http://revis-
tas.ufpr.br/rinc/article/view/50328>
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to murder, then perhaps eviction method which is indirectly deadly could be reasonably 
understood as a proportionate method of self-defense against trespassers of a body78. 
If that comes to be Block’s actual position, then it seems that he would be fol-
lowing Rothbard’s take on the subject. Rothbard actually predicates himself only on the 
principle of proportionality and concludes that “a woman should have the right to eject 
an unwanted parasite within her body as rapidly as possible — whether or not the para-
site is considered ‘human’79”. At first sight, this might seem like a contradiction of Roth-
bard’s previous claim that the death penalty would be strictly restricted to the crime 
of murder80. But then again, some crimes might be so horrendous that it is reasonable 
to think that the principle ‘two teeth for a tooth’ would allow capital punishment, even 
though there was no actually murder involved in that criminal activity.
However, the truth is that Rothbard is actually pro-abortion. Furthermore, He 
doesn’t even believe that a progeny is a full human being, endowed with natural 
rights. Well, at least not until very far in development and most certainly not before 
birth81. Thus, Rothbard can coherently defend the proportionality of killing a body tres-
passer. After all, he is already in favor of unrestricted abortion at any time during the 
pregnancy82. 
Contrariwise, Block is actually against abortion. Furthermore, he believes that a 
progeny is already a human being since the moment of conception and thus has the 
same rights as any other human being. Perhaps Block simply didn’t think Rothbard’s 
arguments through when he used it to dismiss his critic’s arguments. 
Without gentleness, then, if Block wishes to maintain any semblance of coher-
ence, he must choose one of two options: (1) in order to save Evictionism he must give 
up the legitimacy of indirectly deadly evictions; or (2) he may abandon Evictionism al-
together in favor of abortions and, with that, save the legitimacy of indirectly deadly 
evictions. One way or the other, proportionality makes it that indirectly deadly evictions 
are incompatible with Evictionism.
Independently of his choice, I believe that there is an important aspect of 
Block’s gentleness which may be partially salvaged within the Libertarian theory. My 
view is that Block’s algorithm of gentle escalation, although not a principle, is actually a 
78  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The complete Libertarian Forum: 1969-1984, 1. ed. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von 
Mises Institute, 2012, p. 847.Available at: <https://mises.org/library/complete-libertarian-forum-1969-1984>.
79  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The complete Libertarian Forum: 1969-1984, 1. ed. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von 
Mises Institute, 2012, p. 832.Available at: <https://mises.org/library/complete-libertarian-forum-1969-1984>.
80  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 85.Available at: 
<https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
81  ROTHBARD, Murray N. The Ethics of Liberty, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. 97-98.Available 
at: <https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf>.
82  This idea is not without its problems, of course. But we will address this argument on another paper of this 
series.
CEDRIC JOHN AYRES
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 8, n. 2, p. 407-433, maio/ago. 2021.432 
method of epistemological appraisal. But this no longer concerns us here. I’ll tackle that 
on a following paper, on which I will be able to propose positive arguments in favor of 
the illegitimacy of indirectly deadly evictions. As I continue my revision of Evictionism, I 
shall explore other important issues to Libertarianism as a whole, such as the problems 
of ‘threats’ and ‘procedural justice’.
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